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I   INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades corporate governance codes have become a popular 
method of regulating corporate behaviour worldwide. Many stock exchanges 
now use the ‘comply-or-explain’ mechanism to encourage adoption of corporate 
governance practices seen to be beneficial to listed companies and their 
stakeholders.1 The proliferation of these codes in recent years has been dramatic: 
24 countries were reported to have a code of corporate governance in place in 
1999;2 64 countries in 2008;3 and 93 countries had provided their codes to the 
European Corporate Governance Institute in 2015.4 
Codes have not only expanded their scope in a geographical sense but also in 
terms of their content. Initially most codes were aimed at restoring investor 
confidence through better board monitoring and accountability to shareholders 
but more recently they have been extended to encourage disclosure regarding 
social issues such as corporate responsibility and gender diversity. Not only is the 
disclosed information intended to enable better investment decision-making and 
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the smooth running of capital markets, but it also comprises a form of indirect 
regulation aimed at changing the behaviour of corporations.5  
Thus codes of corporate governance have ambitious aims: to improve both 
the internal practice of corporate governance and the external provision of 
information about corporate governance. Yet in most countries code provisions 
are voluntary: codes tend to fall into the category of soft regulation rather than 
hard law, comprising general principles rather than prescriptive rules. It is widely 
accepted that ‘one size does not fit all’ in corporate governance and hence 
companies are permitted to choose to either adopt the recommendations of the 
code or explain why they are not appropriate – a regulatory mechanism known as 
comply-or-explain.6 The only strict requirement is for disclosure of information: 
a corporate governance statement in the annual report of the company must 
describe the company’s approach as compared to the principles of the code.  
The aim of this article is to explore how these codes take effect in terms of 
altering organisational behaviour. In order to do this the article takes part of the 
Australian corporate governance code (ASX code) as a regulatory case study.7 It 
analyses the corporate response to the ASX code’s recommendations on gender 
diversity shortly after their introduction. By doing so the article is able to provide 
insights into the way in which code recommendations are implemented by 
companies and the management processes that can be instigated as a result of this 
kind of soft regulation. This is important because the debate over whether to 
regulate using hard or soft law is still very much alive, especially in the area of 
gender diversity in leadership.8  Many countries in Europe have implemented 
mandatory legislative quotas for women on corporate boards whereas others, 
including the UK and Australia, have incorporated gender diversity into soft 
regulation, usually corporate governance codes.9 
Despite the popularity of comply-or-explain codes, their effectiveness is far 
from proven. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
admits that: ‘Although voluntary codes and principles have the advantage of 
maintaining flexibility and avoiding excessive and costly legal and regulatory 
measures, the question of their effectiveness does arise’. 10  Their widespread 
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introduction has resulted in more corporate reporting regarding governance, yet it 
seems investors may not always engage with this information and it has certainly 
not prevented all incidence of corporate collapse. 11  On the other hand, the 
practices recommended by codes have been widely adopted and the composition 
of the average board has definitely changed. For example, 74 per cent of 
companies on the ASX 500 index had a majority of independent directors in 
2011 whereas in 2004 (just after first introduction of the ASX code) the figure 
was only 38 per cent.12 In terms of gender diversity there has been a steady 
increase in the number of women on Australian corporate boards from 8.4 per 
cent of board positions on the ASX 200 index in 2010 (when code 
recommendations were first introduced) to 22.7 per cent in February 2016.13 
Clearly codes exert a strong influence over corporate governance practice yet we 
do not fully understand how these practices flow through into organisational 
behaviour. 
Most of the research done on the effect of corporate governance codes has 
measured levels of compliance with code provisions ‘rather than the behavioural 
effects in corporate policies and processes which disclosure is intended to secure 
but which are far more difficult to assess’.14 As has been demonstrated by some 
of the more famous corporate collapses in recent years, formal code compliance 
does not always equate to good corporate governance.15 Also, the ethos behind 
corporate governance codes is that they should be flexible, permitting companies 
to design a governance system that suits their size, needs and organisational 
structure rather than adopting a fixed and possibly unsuitable set of standards.16 
For these reasons, compliance is not a good measure of effectiveness, instead 
there is a need for more qualitative research that examines the effectiveness of 
codes of corporate governance in a behavioural sense, including the processes 
through which code implementation can cause organisational change.17  
This is an area rarely researched as it can be difficult to measure and assess 
internal change within organisations and even harder to link it to any particular 
cause. Yet this kind of research is vital if we are to continue along a path of code 
development and expansion. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazzura point out that the  
lack of academic analysis of the behavioural effects of codes is creating a 
divergence between the fast developing practice in the real world and the slow 
                                                 
11  Keay, above n 1, 292–3. 
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pace of theoretical advancement.18 Thus the aim of this article is to develop our 
understanding of how codes influence corporate behaviour, including both their 
advantages and limitations. This knowledge will hopefully have value in 
improving the design of code reforms and understanding the circumstances in 
which they are likely to be most effective.  
Part I has set out the aims, objectives and general context for this article. Part 
II then discusses the comply-or-explain mechanism used by many corporate 
governance codes in the context of contemporary regulatory theory, analysing the 
processes through which it can both elicit information and change behaviour. Part 
III explores the limits of corporate governance codes, what we can expect them 
to achieve within a particular institutional environment and the conditions in 
which they may be most effective. Part IV then introduces an empirical example: 
the response of corporations to the Australian corporate governance code’s 
recommendations regarding gender diversity. This data is used to demonstrate 
the mechanisms through which codes can encourage organisational change: the 
effects that codes can have on internal management practices and the processes 
through which code recommendations are implemented. Part V draws the article 
together, using the empirical evidence to draw conclusions relevant for future 
regulatory policy and design. It identifies the importance of supportive 
institutional forces and norms in the effectiveness of soft regulation and the role 
of regulatory design and disclosure in activating these forces. Where regulation 
provides flexibility and a level of choice it is vital that incentives exist to direct 
those choices in a coherent way that fulfils the spirit and purpose of the 
regulation.19  
 
II   REGULATORY THEORY AND THE DESIGN OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES 
As regulatory tools have become increasingly sophisticated and complex 
over time, so too has the field of regulatory studies. It is difficult to place any 
particular piece of regulation in a clearly defined category because each system 
tends to be unique to the task at hand and the domain in which it is to function. 
For this reason the terminology used by regulatory scholars is far from settled 
and labels applied to regulatory systems cannot be closely relied upon.20 This 
article places corporate governance codes within two categories of regulation: 
management-based regulation and disclosure-based regulation, following the 
theory that codes are aimed at improving internal governance practices as well as 
encouraging disclosure of information.  
 
                                                 
18  Ibid 377. 
19  Donald Feaver and Benedict Sheehy, ‘Designing Effective Regulation: A Normative Theory’ (2015) 38 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 392, 410, 422. 
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A   Corporate Governance Codes as Management-Based Regulation 
Management-based regulation has been defined by Coglianese and Lazer as 
an approach that ‘requires firms to engage in their own planning and internal 
rule-making efforts that are supposed to aim toward the achievement of specific 
public goals’.21 Gunningham and Sinclair similarly describe it as an approach that 
‘involves firms developing their own process and management system standards, 
and developing internal planning and management practices designed to achieve 
regulatory or corporate goals’.22 This article takes, as an example of management-
based regulation, the ASX code recommendations that encourage firms to set and 
implement their own gender diversity targets and policies in order to achieve the 
public goal of increasing women in leadership.23  
Gilad places management-based regulation within the wider family of 
‘process-oriented regulation’,24 in which she also includes ‘meta-regulation’,25 as 
well as ‘new governance’ or ‘principles-based’ regulation.26 These terms tend to 
be grouped together in the literature with authors recognising the similarities 
between them. 27  Meta-regulation refers to the layered aspect of modern 
regulatory systems, ‘the proliferation of different forms of regulation (whether 
tools of state law or non-law mechanisms) each regulating one another’.28 Thus 
by adding a layer of independent oversight, self-regulation can become meta-
regulation.29 The Australian corporate governance code provides an example of 
this way of regulating. The meta-regulatory hierarchy starts with sections 674 
and 1311 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which set up the ASX and gives it 
power to draft the Listing Rules, compliance with which is enforced by sanctions. 
The Listing Rules require disclosure against the ASX code, a non-legal set of 
recommendations drafted by the ASX Corporate Governance Council. Thus if a 
company wishes to have its shares listed on the ASX, it must make comply-or-
explain disclosures against the recommendations of the code or risk being 
                                                 
21  Coglianese and Lazer, above n 5, 692, citing Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan, Going by the Book: The 
Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (Temple University Press, 1982) 224. 
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Regulation’ (2009) 43 Law & Society Review 865, 865. 
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Edition’, above n 7, 11. 
24  Sharon Gilad, ‘It Runs in the Family: Meta-Regulation and Its Siblings’ (2010) 4 Regulation & 
Governance 485, 485. 
25  Ibid. See also Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) ch 9; Christine Parker, ‘Meta-regulation: Legal Accountability for 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The 
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Press, 2007) 207. 
26  Gilad, above n 24. See also Cristie L Ford, ‘New Governance, Compliance and Principles-Based 
Securities Regulation’ (2008) 45 American Business Law Journal 1. 
27  Lorraine Talbot, Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century (Routledge, 2013) 148; 
Coglianese and Lazer, above n 5, 692; Orly Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise 
of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342, 346. 
28  Parker, ‘Meta-regulation’, above n 25, 208. 
29  Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 22, 866. 
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delisted. This is a complex regulatory system involving a mixture of hard law, 
principles and contractual obligations.  
Talbot explains that ‘[m]eta-regulation in its simplest form, involves the 
regulator delegating authority to the regulatee to design its own standard setting 
and mode of compliance which is then overseen by the regulator’.30 In the case of 
corporate governance codes, companies are free to choose their own unique 
governance structure as long as they disclose what it is. Although the regulator 
enforces the disclosure of this information, it leaves it to the investment market to 
judge the value or otherwise of the company’s chosen corporate governance 
system. Talbot neatly summarises many of the advantages of taking a meta-
regulatory approach including its ability to: avoid the ‘one size fits all’ problem; 
enable social goals; become integrated into organisational structures; and 
promote reflexive learning processes.31 Reflexive, smart or responsive regulation 
are other terms that have been applied to similar regulatory mechanisms that 
permit learning and improvement over time.32 
New governance appears to be a broader term used in the United States 
which encompasses a wide range of contemporary approaches to regulation.33 
Ford and Condon explain some of the elements agreed to be central to new 
governance including, ‘a restructured and more collaborative relationship 
between the state and regulated entities, based on the recognition that regulation 
may operate most effectively when it incorporates private actors’ context-specific 
experience and relevant expertise’.34 Overall, new governance scholars recognise 
a reorientation in regulatory practice, ‘away from the familiar model of 
command-style, fixed-rule regulation by administrative fiat, and toward a new 
model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving New 
Governance’.35 Most corporate governance codes fall within this remit because 
they comprise general principles and voluntary recommendations that can be 
adapted to company circumstances. In other words they fall within the remit of 
soft law rather than hard law. Soft law has been defined to comprise ‘regulatory 
instruments and mechanisms of governance that, while implicating some kind of 
normative commitment, do not rely on binding rules or on a regime of formal 
sanctions’.36 Dempsey points out that one of the great strengths of principles-
based regulation is that it leaves no loopholes and can cover unforeseen 
                                                 
30  Talbot, above n 27, 151. 
31  Ibid 151–2. 
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34  Cristie Ford and Mary Condon, ‘Introduction to “New Governance and the Business Organization”: 
Special Issue of Law & Policy’ (2011) 33 Law & Policy 449, 450. 
35  Bradley C Karkkainen, ‘Reply: “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as 
Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 471, 473; Feaver and Sheehy, 
above n 19. 
36  Anna Di Robilant, ‘Genealogies of Soft Law’ (2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 499, 499. 
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situations.37 On the other hand, some scholars still strongly believe that new 
governance style regulation is not capable of countering the effects of economic 
self-interest and therefore has limited use in the field of corporate governance.38  
Although regulatory terminology is unsettled and likely to remain so, the 
trend away from traditional law towards soft, flexible regulation shows no sign of 
abating. In such circumstances it is vital to understand how soft regulation takes 
effect and how we can reduce its inherent limitations and expand its scope. 
Although management-based regulation has become a popular policy tool, very 
little is known about the conditions in which it can be most effective.39  
 
B   Comply-or-Explain as Disclosure-Based Regulation 
As well as being a soft, flexible form of regulation, designed to become 
integrated into organisational management practice, corporate governance codes 
fall within the category of disclosure-based regulation. Compliance with most 
codes can be achieved even if all recommendations are rejected, as long as the 
reasons for rejection are explained in a public statement, usually the company’s 
annual report. 
Disclosure of information has long been used as a mechanism of corporate 
accountability but more recently has also been viewed as a tool of regulation.40 
The distinction is subtle – if disclosure of information is purely an exercise in 
correcting for information asymmetries, for example, between corporate 
managers and shareholders, then disclosure is a regulatory goal rather than a 
regulatory strategy.41 If, however, the information disclosure has another purpose 
– to change the behaviour of the firm and improve corporate governance 
practices, it can be viewed as a form of management-based regulation. Indeed, 
Kingsford Smith places behavioural change as the most compelling reason for 
corporate governance guidelines: the fact that they ‘might help good governance 
practices to be internalised in the corporation’s everyday operations’.42  
The theory behind ‘comply-or-explain’ corporate governance codes is that 
the requirement to disclose will lead to enforcement of code principles by the 
investment market. The assumption is that there is a market for good governance 
– investors will assess each company’s disclosures and good governance will be 
recognised in the value of the company’s shares. In other words, the theory is 
based on an assumption that ‘shareholders will consider non-compliance or 
unsatisfactorily explained non-compliance negatively. It also assumes that the 
market responds not just to disclosure or not, but also its content’.43 
                                                 
37  Dempsey, above n 20, 83. 
38  See, eg, Janis Sarra, ‘New Governance, Old Norms, and the Potential for Corporate Governance Reform’ 
(2011) 33 Law & Policy 576. 
39  Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 22, 896. 
40  Spira and Page, above n 5, 410. 
41  Coglianese and Lazer, above n 5, 695. 
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However, several researchers have found that investor engagement over 
corporate governance disclosure has been much less active than expected.44 Keay 
concludes that codes are not effective because investors, even the large 
institutional investors, do not assess and engage with companies over their 
corporate governance practices and ultimately do not base investment decisions 
on them.45 MacNeil and Li also conclude that the ‘comply-or-explain’ approach 
does not work as envisaged, however for slightly different reasons: they found 
that investors did not value reasoned arguments for non-compliance because they 
used financial performance as a proxy.46 Thus they describe the effect of the code 
as ‘comply or perform’. Although this suggests a lack of interest in governance it 
may amount to a higher standard for companies, requiring them to prove the 
value of alternative governance structures rather than simply explain them.47 
Overall, the evidence suggests that the detail of corporate governance 
information is not a priority factor for fund managers when making investment 
decisions.48  However, this does not necessarily make the ‘comply-or-explain’ 
mechanism ineffective at causing behavioural change within companies. Spira 
and Page point out that ‘the knowledge that disclosure is required may have an 
earlier and equally important effect on management behavior’.49 This article, by 
reviewing corporate disclosures in response to the ASX code’s diversity 
recommendations, aims to explore the behavioural effects of corporate 
governance codes: their management-based effects, including how and why they 
occur. 
Certainly, the evidence is that the large majority of listed companies do adopt 
the ASX recommendations.50 If it is not fear of judgment by investors causing 
this behaviour, what does drive companies to implement the ASX 
recommendations? There are two theoretical possibilities: first that external 
expectations and a need for legitimacy are driving compliance (which may be 
relatively superficial); and, second, that companies are choosing to adopt 
practices because they see genuine value or efficiency gains in doing so.51 In the 
first case the regulation taps into the external expectations of stakeholders to 
enforce compliance (if not investors’ expectations then perhaps ratings agencies 
or regulators); whereas in the second case the regulation also builds on existing 
‘intrinsic motivation’ thereby encouraging co-operation with both the letter and 
                                                 
44  Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno and Antoine Faure-Grimaud, ‘Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the 
Comply or Explain Approach Working?’ (2010) 30 International Review of Law and Economics 193; 
Keay, above n 1; MacNeil and Li, above n 6. 
45  Keay, above n 1, 293. 
46  MacNeil and Li, above n 6, 492. 
47  Ibid 493. 
48  Keay, above n 1; Alice Klettner and Thomas Clarke, ‘Company Secretary: Board Performance Evaluation 
Post-Financial Crisis’ (2011) 63 Keeping Good Companies 200, 205. 
49  Spira and Page, above n 5, 411. 
50  Grant Thornton, above n 12, 8. 
51  Alessandro Zattoni and Francesca Cuomo, ‘Why Adopt Codes of Good Governance? A Comparison of 
Institutional and Efficiency Perspectives’ (2008) 16 Corporate Governance: An International Review 1. 
2016 Corporate Governance Codes and Gender Diversity 723
spirit of the regulation.52 Clearly the second case is the preferred scenario and 
flexible regulation is generally seen to be more likely to achieve this outcome 
because it allows managers to choose how to implement governance systems 
rather than imposing systems upon them.53 
 
III   REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS: THE ROLE OF NORMS 
AND INSTITUTIONS 
Norms can be defined as ‘observed behavioural regularit[ies]’, like wearing a 
suit for office work or forming a queue at the bus stop.54 These are rules or 
standards of behaviour that are not legally enforceable but are enforced or 
encouraged by other social means: peer pressure, social acceptance, shaming or 
concerns about reputation. Norms relevant to corporate behaviour can be both 
internal and external. Internal norms make up the culture of the organisation and 
can be developed through either top-down processes (the board communicating 
its expectations) or bottom-up ones (employee agreement on methods of task 
performance). Rock and Wachter explain that ‘behavioral rules and standards for 
corporate actors are provided by corporate culture and are essentially norm-
based’.55 They stress the importance of studying the role played by norms in the 
corporate arena: 
Norms may help explain the manner in which the law, in the absence of bright line 
rules, influences corporate governance. Norms may also explain why standards 
rather than rules work well in a corporate setting.56 
External norms of behaviour develop as a result of institutional forces and 
have been explained by theories of institutional isomorphism that suggest that 
corporations facing similar external pressures will develop similar corporate 
governance practices in response. 57  These external norms affecting corporate 
behaviour are what we might call norms of best practice. Corporate social 
responsibility is an area where corporations are left with a great deal of discretion 
in terms of how to react and how to report. Yet a review of annual corporate 
responsibility reports demonstrates a norm of disclosure across areas such as 
employee relations, health and safety, environmental performance and 
community relations. There is a close relationship between this observed practice 
                                                 
52  Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 22, 894. 
53  Sumit K Majumdar and Alfred A Marcus, ‘Rules versus Discretion: The Productivity Consequences of 
Flexible Regulation’ (2001) 44 Academy of Management Journal 170. 
54  Edward B Rock and Michael L Wachter, ‘Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
governing Corporation’ (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1619, 1641. 
55  Edward B Rock and Michael L Wachter, ‘Symposium: Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction’ (2001) 
149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1607, 1608. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Matthew D Lynall, Brian R Golden and Amy J Hillman, ‘Board Composition from Adolescence to 
Maturity: A Multitheoretic View’ (2003) 28 Academy of Management Review 416, 416; Paul J DiMaggio 
and Walter W Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields’ (1983) 48 American Sociological Review 147. 
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and the development of soft law initiatives such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative (‘GRI’) and other reporting guidelines. Black refers to a study that 
shows that norm building is often started by a ‘small but global community of 
professionals rather than through the application of established legal rules’.58 She 
notes there are only ‘scatterings of empirical research’ into how norms develop in 
financial markets despite many scholars noting their influence on behaviour.59 
Najarajan has looked at the issue of gender diversity in Australian companies and 
explains the polycentric nature of the governance of this issue: regulatory action 
was made possible due to the contribution of many different organisations and 
subtle steering by the state.60  
 
A   Norms and Regulation 
When regulation is voluntary, as is the case for codes of corporate 
governance, the interaction between norms and regulation becomes very 
important in determining regulatory effectiveness. Gunningham and Sinclair 
conclude that ‘for sociolegal scholars … the key theoretical and empirical issues 
have come to involve the relationships between regulatory norms and 
organizational behavior’.61 
The close relationship between norms and soft regulation, such as codes of 
conduct, is evident in that norms often reflect a common interpretation of a code 
principle or – vice versa – the principle is based on common expectations of 
conduct. Indeed, one of the recurring questions regarding the relationship 
between soft law and norms is the question of which comes first: ‘Does soft law 
evolve into social norms or do social norms generate soft law?’62 Most scholars 
suggest that both of these propositions are correct and that norms and soft law are 
mutually reinforcing and develop in parallel.63 Using human rights norms as an 
example, Moore Dickerson describes a feedback loop whereby ‘[a]s the actual 
behavior of multinationals becomes increasingly consistent with the evolving 
human-rights norms, the behavior both reinforces the norms, and is reinforced by 
them’.64 She goes further to suggest that, despite being rather unstructured, this 
process is akin to democracy and tends to acquire the type of legitimacy afforded 
to democratically approved conclusions.  
                                                 
58  Julia Black, ‘Financial Markets’ in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010) 168, citing J Flood and E Skordaki, 
‘Normative Bricolage: Informal Rule Making by Accountants and Lawyers in Mega-Insolvencies’ in 
Gunther Teubner (ed), Global Law without a State (Dartmouth Publishing, 1997). 
59  Black, above n 58, 168. 
60  Vijaya Nagarajan, ‘Regulating for Women on Corporate Boards: Polycentric Governance in Australia’ 
(2011) 39 Federal Law Review 255, 256. 
61  Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 22, 894. 
62  Ulrika Mörth, ‘Introduction’ in Ulrika Mörth (ed), Soft Law in Governance and Regulation: An 
Interdisciplinary Analysis (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005) 4. 
63  See, eg, E Norman Veasey, ‘Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate 
Governance Practices – Or Vice Versa?’ (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2179, 2189. 
64  Claire Moore Dickerson, ‘Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
(2002) 76 Tulane Law Review 1431, 1460. 
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Similarly Mörth claims that norms are often codified as soft law and in this 
sense norm development can be seen as the first stage in the law-making process. 
She asks, ‘to what extent should soft law be seen as a transitional mode of 
regulation? Or can it be seen as an independent form of regulation?’65 Most 
regulatory theories posit that soft regulation can be a first choice rather than a 
transitional phase, ‘preferred over legally binding rules when there is a need for 
flexibility and rapid reactions and when there is a concern about the possibility of 
non-compliance’. 66  Usually in the realm of corporate governance there is no 
expectation that codes will ultimately be hardened into legislation yet gender 
diversity may be different. Some countries, for example Denmark, have reduced 
code coverage of the topic and introduced legislative measures instead.  
Norms and other institutional forces can either support regulatory objectives 
or work against them. In the case of the collapse of Enron, norms of good 
corporate governance were defeated by internal cultural norms that supported 
highly risky trading, dubious accounting and personal financial gain. 67  The 
importance of workplace culture on the effectiveness of management-based 
regulation was also revealed by Gunningham and Sinclair in their research on 
mining companies. They found that management-based regulation regarding 
occupational health and safety was only effective where there was already a 
culture of trust and commitment. 68  In the area of gender diversity Branson 
stresses the importance of ‘energy and emphasis’ in maintaining progress, 
demonstrating that this can emanate from non-legal initiatives such as mentoring 
schemes, education and investor engagement.69 Other researchers also note the 
importance of international norms of practice and politics in the development of 
national regulation promoting gender diversity on boards.70 
As discussed in Part II, the disclosures required by the comply-or-explain 
mechanism are designed to tap into external norms and expectations, indeed, they 
presume that such forces exist and will help to enforce code adoption. However, 
researchers have found these expected institutional forces to be weak (less 
investor engagement) and other unexpected institutional forces to be strong 
(pressure to comply rather than explain). Indeed, a common criticism of the 
effectiveness of corporate governance codes is that the flexibility provided by the 
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comply-or-explain mechanism is not used by companies due to external pressures 
to conform (often in the form of compliance-oriented rating agencies).71  
Hooghiemstra and van Ees examined the corporate response to the Dutch 
‘comply-or-explain’ corporate governance code. They found that companies 
tended to comply with the code or confine themselves to accepted arguments to 
explain non-compliance. Their findings indicated ‘uniformity in adopting the 
standard of good governance which is not in line with the logic of corporate 
governance codes and casts doubt on the effectiveness of this form of soft law’.72 
They point to the institutional pressures that work against innovation and 
uniqueness in governance systems and their research provides evidence of 
‘powers of isomorphism’ that hinder firms from using the discretion permitted by 
codes of corporate governance and instead push them towards uniformity.73 
This pressure to conform to a code of corporate governance rather than make 
use of its flexible nature has been noted by other scholars, however, it may be 
limited to the early response to the introduction of a code.74 Seidl, Sanderson and 
Roberts, in their recent research based on the UK and German codes, found that 
‘the sheer number of deviations recorded would seem to suggest that concerns 
about companies being driven towards full compliance are largely unfounded’.75 
Confirming the importance of flexibility in cost-effectiveness, Luo and Salterio 
show that it can bring tangible financial benefits to shareholders.76 The ASX 
Corporate Governance Council took steps to educate both companies and 
investors on the option of non-adoption of the code principles after its own 
survey revealed this early pressure to conform.77 In this case, the pressure arose 
as a result of ratings agencies that were scoring companies’ corporate governance 
on the basis of the number of code principles complied with, rather than quality 
of disclosures.78 In South Africa following similar problems, the third edition of 
the corporate governance code introduced an ‘apply-or-explain’ mechanism 
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instead of ‘comply-or-explain’: a simple change of terminology designed to 
convey the fact that ‘compliance’ was not the aim of the code.79  
 
IV   TESTING THE EFFECT OF MANAGEMENT-BASED 
REGULATION 
This article aims to develop regulatory theory by using the ASX code as a 
case study. This is an approach used by other regulatory scholars: by testing 
theory against empirical case studies researchers have gained understanding of 
the limits of new regulatory approaches and their potential advantages.80 Ford and 
Hess examined the United States’ post-global financial crisis corporate 
monitorship regulation in order to explore the limitations of ‘new governance’ 
style regulation.81 They examined the practical effect of the monitorship regime 
against its theoretical potential in a similar fashion to this article’s assessment of 
the ASX code’s provisions on gender diversity. Their conclusion was that the 
monitorship regime did not fulfil its theoretical promise and they were able to 
identify some of the reasons why, including the sociological and institutional 
forces at play. Performing such an assessment is an important exercise, 
‘[u]nderstanding how new governance initiatives will play out within the 
dynamics and institutional processes of particular regulatory regimes is an 
essential step in making new governance an effective tool for regulatory 
design’. 82  Corporate governance regulation has already gone through several 
cycles of reform and yet corporate collapses continue to occur.83 Although we 
cannot expect to create a perfect system of corporate governance, we can do 
more to understand both the potential and limitations of the reforms we put in 
place. 
 
A   Methodology 
This article focuses on a small element of the Australian corporate 
governance code, namely the recommendations encouraging gender diversity that 
were added to the code in 2010. The three main recommendations are as follows: 
 Companies should establish a policy concerning diversity and disclose 
the policy or a summary of it (policy recommendation); 
 Companies should disclose in each annual report the measurable 
objectives for achieving gender diversity set by the board in accordance 
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with the diversity policy and progress towards achieving them (targets 
recommendation); 
 Companies should disclose in each annual report the proportion of 
women employees in the whole organisation, women in senior executive 
positions and women on the board (metrics recommendation).84  
These provisions were added to the code in the context of an international 
debate over the lack of women on corporate boards.85 In Europe many countries 
had put in place legislative quotas, while the Australian debate concluded in 
favour of a voluntary approach, implemented via the existing code of corporate 
governance.86 Thus the broad objective of the recommendations was to increase 
the number of women in listed corporations, particularly in leadership. The 
corporate governance code was subsequently bolstered by a parallel legislative 
reporting regime set up and monitored by the Australian Government’s 
Workplace Gender Equality Agency (‘WGEA’). This required companies with 
over 100 employees to report on various ‘gender equality indicators’ including 
the gender composition of the workforce, gender pay equality and the availability 
and utility of flexible working conditions.87 
Since the introduction of the gender diversity recommendations, there has 
been a steady increase in the number of women on Australian corporate boards.88 
However, the aim of this article is not to measure outcomes but to explore wider 
organisational change. Percentage increases of female board members across 
large listed corporations do not always equate to meaningful change. First these 
board level increases are not reflected in executive ranks; secondly they may not 
equate to a critical mass of individuals (said to be three or more women on a 
board); thirdly they may be confined to certain industry sectors; and lastly they 
do not necessarily prevent the loss of women from the corporate workforce at 
mid-management level.89 The aim of this article is to examine the effectiveness of 
the more direct and immediate objectives of the ASX recommendations: to 
encourage company leaders to consider how they might improve overall 
workplace diversity, particularly gender diversity, through drafting policies, 
setting targets and measuring the number of women across their organisations. In 
other words, it examines the management systems and processes that are likely to 
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be implemented and improved as a result of the regulation – the process of 
creating change rather than the outcome. 
The data presented in this article was obtained from the 2011 annual reports 
of the 200 largest companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange as at 
16 March 2012 (‘ASX 200’) and represents the early response of these 
companies to the diversity recommendations. Indeed, compliance statistics at this 
stage were not greatly meaningful because the new code recommendations were 
only formally in force for companies with a December financial year-end (only 
17 per cent of ASX 200 companies). Despite this, a total of 114 companies (57 
per cent) stated that they had put in place a diversity policy and 92 companies or 
42 per cent had provided all of the suggested gender metrics. However, the aim 
of this research was not to count compliance but to explore, in a qualitative way, 
the sorts of changes that were being implemented as a result of the diversity 
policy (or the sorts of changes disclosed as intended to be implemented). 
Content analysis was used to assess the number of companies that reported 
specific policy or process changes in their disclosures against the ASX code’s 
diversity recommendations. These policy and process changes were generally 
described as being part of the diversity policy or as amounting to ‘measurable 
objectives’ set in accordance with the policy. The diversity disclosures, as a 
whole, generally comprised a well-delineated section of text within the corporate 
governance statement of the company’s annual report which was copied into a 
software program for content analysis. The most important part of designing a 
process of content analysis is in deciding upon the coding categories: generally 
researchers are guided by existing theory and the hypotheses they wish to test.90 
Cresswell recommends that if a ‘prefigured’ coding scheme is used in analysis, 
researchers should still remain open to additional codes emerging during the 
analysis.91 For this research the ASX suggestions as to the content of a diversity 
policy (lettered A to E below) formed the basis of the ‘prefigured’ categories for 
content analysis.92 As the research progressed, a further ‘emergent’ category F 
was added because the data revealed that many companies had set up a 
committee to lead and monitor diversity. The coding categories were finalised as 
follows: 
A. Articulation of the corporate benefits arising from diversity. 
B. Inclusion of diversity in recruitment and selection processes. 
C. Executive mentoring or training programmes for diversity. 
D. Creating a culture that supports diversity and recognises domestic 
responsibilities. 
E. Tying diversity targets to Key Performance Indicators. 
                                                 
90  Katharina J Srnka and Sabine T Koeszegi, ‘From Words to Numbers: How to Transform Qualitative Data 
into Meaningful Quantitative Results’ (2007) 59 Schmalenbach Business Review 29, 36. 
91  John W Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches (SAGE, 
3rd ed, 2013) 185. 
92  ASX Corporate Governance Council, ‘Principles and Recommendations: 2nd Edition’, above n 84, 24. 
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F. Setting up a board or management committee responsible for diversity 
policy. 
For each of the issues A to F above a selection of keywords was identified 
(see Table 1) and each word was searched for across all of the ASX 200 diversity 
statements. For each incidence of each keyword, the surrounding paragraph was 
taken as the unit of analysis and if the meaning of the paragraph corresponded 
with the relevant policy change the company was included in the score for that 
policy change.93 As described below, for some issues, statements were further 
categorised as ‘well-articulated’ or ‘basic’ in terms of the quality of information 
provided, an approach taken by other studies of corporate disclosure statements.94 
The risk of subjectivity inherent in such judgments is accepted, however, as Spira 
and Page noted, ‘[i]t does not seem possible to distinguish between these kinds of 
disclosure through quantitative measurement such as word count or pre-defined 
content analysis: instead a holistic semantic analysis of the disclosures is 
required’.95 
 
B   Findings: Integration into Workplace Policies 
The keywords and overall results are summarised in Table 1 and discussed 
further below. It is accepted that the sample size and timing of this research 
(before the recommendations were fully in force) means that the quantitative 
results regarding the number of companies implementing certain policies do not 
represent a measure of regulatory effectiveness. Indeed this was not the purpose 
of the research – its objective was to explore in a qualitative manner the types of 
management processes that can be instigated as a result of soft regulation. Its 
limitations include the fact that we do not know how many companies will 
actually follow through with what they say they will do. Further research will be 
needed to assess whether these processes and policies are actually implemented 
and whether they achieve the long term outcome of increasing the numbers of 
women in corporate leadership.  
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Table 1: Content Analysis of Annual Report Disclosures on Diversity 
 Content Search words Number of companies 
A Articulation of the corporate benefits 




71 (35.5%)  





34 (17.0%)  






D Articulation of a culture that supports 






E Linking diversity targets to executives Key 





4 (2.0%)  
F Responsibility for diversity objectives 




60 (30.0%)  
 
1 Articulating the Benefits of Diversity 
The benefits of diversity were articulated well by 38 companies and a basic 
statement was provided by a further 33 companies, making a total of 71 
companies or 35.5 per cent of the ASX 200 that had made an effort to describe 
why diversity can be of value. Statements that only said that the company ‘values 
diversity’ or that it was an ‘important consideration’ were not counted as 
‘articulating’ the benefits of diversity. Statements were considered ‘well-
articulated’ if they demonstrated that thought had gone into the reasons behind 
diversity policies and the specific benefits for the company, for example: 
Alacer values this diversity and recognizes the organisational strength, deeper 
problem solving ability and opportunity for innovation that it brings. (Alacer Gold 
Corp) 
The Company recognises that building a diverse leadership and employee group is 
important to: drive innovation and step change growth through diversity of 
thought; enable a better understanding of the DuluxGroup consumer and customer 
base; and enable the Company to attract and retain top talent from the widest 
possible talent pool. (Dulux Group) 
A basic statement, recognising the benefits but not actually articulating what 
they are, included the sentence below which was used by at least three different 
companies – a classic example of legal ‘boilerplate’ and the use of standardised 
precedents: 
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The company values diversity and recognises the benefits it can bring to the 
organisation’s ability to achieve its goals. (Bathurst Resources; Billabong 
International; Extract Resources) 
Spira and Page note that while the use of boilerplate has generally been 
deplored it may be both expected and serve a function.96 As discussed above, 
institutional theory predicts that companies will exhibit a level of uniformity or 
isomorphism in their governance and this has been confirmed by empirical 
evidence.97 Spira and Page argue that perhaps boilerplate disclosures are enough 
to assure the investment community that a satisfactory level of governance has 
been achieved and that it is the fact of having to disclose, rather than the form or 
content of a specific disclosure, that has the most impact on corporate 
behaviour.98 
 
2 Including Diversity in Recruitment and Selection 
There were 34 companies in the ASX 200 that expressly stated that they had 
made changes to recruitment, selection or appointment policies to include 
diversity considerations. Here companies were included if they had reviewed or 
included recruitment practices in their diversity strategy or had made changes to 
policies to ensure diverse/female candidates were included. Common changes 
were a commitment to include female candidates in the pool for selection and to 
include female employees on the interview panel. Changes that encouraged the 
recruitment of a diverse range of candidates were included but not those that 
simply confirmed that recruitment practices were non-discriminatory. Anti-
discrimination and equal employment opportunity legislation has been in place 
for many years and has not improved gender diversity in corporate leadership. 
Thus a company was not included if it only confirmed that it had equal 
opportunity policies in place, or recruited only on merit, or was transparent in 
recruitment decisions. The intended effect of the ASX recommendations, and of 
the creation of a diversity policy, is to go further and actively attempt to remove 
the unconscious bias that tends to exist in recruitment practices.99 It is an example 
of how soft regulation can influence behaviour in areas where prescriptive law 
has failed. Indeed, three companies expressly mentioned the need to address 
unconscious bias and others had introduced proactive policy changes aimed at 
improving diversity: 
Recruitment training was rolled out to 74 line managers in 2011 as part of the 
leadership fundamentals program, the objective being to emphasise the importance 
of considering diversity related issues while recruiting. (Coca-Cola Amatil) 
Our objective is to implement recruitment practices which aim for a mix of 
appropriately qualified men and women shortlisted for both Board positions and 
senior roles within our organisation, and that men and women make the hiring 
decisions together. (Hastings) 
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Some companies explained that changes to recruitment practices were part of 
a formal policy review to ensure all existing policies were updated in accordance 
with the diversity policy. Others expressed changes to recruitment practices as 
‘measurable objectives’. The difference is that the ASX code suggests that 
progress towards achievement of ‘measurable objectives’ should be reported in 
future annual reports. This is likely to provide additional incentive to carefully 
define the objective and ensure implementation. 
 
3 Mentoring, Development and Training Programs To Increase Diversity 
There were 50 companies in the ASX 200 (25 per cent) that referred to the 
use of mentoring, development or training programs designed to increase 
diversity. Only programs that were designed to develop leadership capabilities, 
skills development or career progression, or those that were described as ‘talent 
management’ for increasing diversity were counted. General training around 
diversity awareness and the diversity policy was not included particularly as 
many were described as an addition to existing equal opportunity, anti-
discrimination or general induction training. Also excluded were companies that 
mentioned such programs without linking them to the objective of increased 
diversity. The aim of the research was to identify positive change rather than 
maintenance of the status quo: 
Our objective is a year-on-year increase in the percentage of women in 
management and professional positions, achieved through the enhancement and 
promotion of mentoring and educational initiatives to support high potential 
women to gain experience and skills required to move into management positions. 
(SP Ausnet) 
The quote above was presented as a ‘measurable objective’ whereas other 
companies referred to mentoring and training in a more general sense as part of 
their diversity policy. Again, the significance of this is that by classing a program 
as a ‘measurable objective’ the company is setting up an expectation that it will 
report on progress in its next annual report. 
 
4 Creating a Culture that Supports Diversity 
The ASX’s suggestions as to the content of a diversity policy recognise the 
need for a culture that accepts employees’ domestic responsibilities and in doing 
so enables more carers to remain employed and progress their careers. In the 
ASX 200 sample, 54 companies (27 per cent) referred to the use of flexible 
working and leave policies, as well as general cultural change, as a way of 
increasing diversity. Here is evidence of the use of soft regulation as a tool to 
encourage cultural change in complex situations where prescriptive regulation 
would be inappropriate.100 As with changes to other policies and processes, some 
of these changes were framed as ‘measurable objectives’ for increasing gender 
diversity whereas others were presented in a general discussion of the company’s 
approach to diversity. 
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Insurance Australia Group disclosed a particularly impressive set of policies 
to support the needs of its workers with a wide range of flexible working options 
including career breaks, working from home, compressed working weeks, job-
sharing and flexi-time. Interestingly, the insurance industry is one of the only 
Australian industries to be consistently in the top five industries for female 
representation at board level.101 Whether this is a result of this kind of policy or a 
reason for the existence of this kind of policy, is worthy of further research.  
 
5 Linking Diversity to Key Performance Indicators 
The emerging concept of linking non-financial indicators to remuneration, 
perhaps through bonus schemes, is seen as a promising method for changing 
managerial practices in favour of corporate responsibility.102 However, only four 
companies in the ASX 200 included mention of linking diversity objectives to 
KPIs and, of these, only two stated that KPIs had actually been linked to diversity 
objectives (as opposed to this possibly happening in future). 103  It will be 
interesting to see if this becomes more common in future and whether it proves 
effective at altering behaviour or becomes lost in the overall mix of performance 
incentives. 
 
6 Committee Responsibility  
An interesting finding was that 60 companies (30 per cent) in the ASX 200 
had reviewed the lines of accountability and responsibility for diversity and 
disclosed the fact that they had allocated responsibility to a particular board sub-
committee (usually nomination or remuneration) or to a group such as a 
dedicated Diversity Council. This was not suggested in the ASX 
recommendations and therefore is a clear sign of companies taking the initiative 
and incorporating diversity into their corporate governance framework on the 
basis of intrinsic motivation.104 Some companies explained that this had involved 
formal amendment of the board and committee charters to allocate responsibility 
to the committee to review and report progress to the board on a regular basis. 
Others detailed a more complex hierarchy of governance structures whereby an 
executive diversity committee would report to the board committee. 
Statements that the nomination committee considers diversity when 
considering new candidates were not included. The aim was to count statements 
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that allocated specific responsibility for setting diversity strategy and objectives 
(and progress towards those objectives) to a certain group. In other words, this 
category was concerned with companies that had defined lines of accountability 
for diversity policy, not those who had reviewed their board selection processes. 
The board as a whole has ultimate responsibility for diversity objectives but it 
was interesting to see how companies had used existing corporate governance 
structures (or created new ones) to clarify responsibility, and presumably 
increase efficiency – an example of the innovation that is encouraged by flexible 
regulation. 105  It suggests that corporate governance structures can provide 
efficiency gains as well as legitimacy benefits. 
 
V   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This article has examined how the ASX code recommendations suggest that 
companies establish a diversity policy and set voluntary targets for increasing 
gender diversity have resulted in wider management changes in many 
organisations. Firms have begun to articulate the benefits of diversity and make 
changes to recruit, train and retain women through policy amendments that will 
hopefully lead to broader cultural change. This slice of empirical evidence 
supports and contributes to three aspects of the theory behind management-based 
regulation: (1) the sorts of issues it might be effective at solving; (2) why and 
how it works to change behaviour; (3) its limitations and conditions required for 
effectiveness. 
 
A   Issues Suited to Management-Based Regulation 
First, the evidence described in this article supports the general theory behind 
‘new governance’ or non-prescriptive regulation which is that it may provide a 
solution to problems that are too complex, dynamic and unpredictable for 
traditional regulatory approaches.106 Corporate governance as a whole can be said 
to fall into this bracket because of the variable and dynamic nature of corporate 
operations and financial markets.107 This article demonstrates how soft law can go 
‘further than law’ to influence behaviour in the grey area of social 
responsibility.108 Although hard law can address the issue of women in leadership 
through setting quotas and prohibiting gender discrimination, this has not so far 
been successful at preventing the exodus of women from middle management. 
Norway’s hard legislative quota for women on boards has achieved compliance 
at board level but, as yet, does not appear to have improved levels of female 
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executives. 109  As a contrast, the Australian code recommendations on gender 
diversity have encouraged discussion around flexible work arrangements for both 
men and women that may assist families to maintain two incomes during 
important early career stages. Rather than only setting targets for women on 
boards, many companies have also set themselves targets for increasing women 
in their executive or management teams.110 
This article supports Ford and Hess’ conclusion that new governance 
techniques have the potential to encourage ‘a more meaningful process of 
corporate cultural reform than more traditional enforcement techniques’.111 New 
governance techniques can and are being used to tackle complicated social 
problems related to corporate behaviour, not only the lack of women in 
leadership but also wider issues of corporate responsibility and business ethics.112 
As Hess states, ‘the challenge the law faces is to … support internal change 
initiatives that may be unique to any particular corporation’.113 Although many 
companies focused their diversity policy on gender, others had chosen to 
emphasise the employment of indigenous people or local workers as important 
within their industry. 
 
B   How Management-Based Regulation Changes Behaviour 
The findings of this article support regulatory theories that predict that by 
delegating problem solving to the targets of regulation, more effective solutions 
may be found. The idea is that because targets have greater knowledge about 
their operations than the regulator, they are more likely to be able to find the 
most cost-effective solution.114 They may also perceive their own rules as more 
reasonable than those imposed by outsiders and therefore be more likely to 
comply with them.115 Voluntary targets set in the early stages ranged from 15 per 
cent to 43 per cent for women on boards and 15 per cent to 50 per cent for 
women in management teams demonstrating both the variable existing levels  
of diversity and the challenges faced by different industries.116 In some retail 
companies, improving diversity might involve recruiting more men, whereas 
mining and engineering have traditionally been very male-dominated industries 
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where it will take longer to change the culture and demonstrate attractive roles 
for women. 
The Australian corporate governance recommendations regarding gender 
diversity provide an interesting example of soft law in action: they not only 
suggest that companies draft a diversity policy and disclose information but ask 
companies to set their own targets for increasing gender diversity and report 
annually on progress towards those targets. They comprise many of the steps that 
organisational scholars include in change management theory: analysis of the 
need for change; strong leadership; and implementation and institutionalisation 
of success through formal policies, systems and structures.117 They demonstrate 
how well designed ‘comply-or-explain’ regulation can do more than simply 
suggest the implementation of specific governance structures and procedures. 
These recommendations set up a cycle of self-measurement, self-set policy and 
self-monitoring made public through disclosure. This disclosure undoubtedly 
plays a part in encouraging change, especially when code recommendations are 
drafted to include both the planning stage (setting policies and targets) as well as 
the implementation stage (through requesting progress reports).118 If regulation 
only deals with planning it makes it too easy for companies to fail to follow 
through and implement their newly drafted policies. Soft regulation may not be 
able to achieve large leaps, which may still require more traditional prescriptive 
techniques,119 but it can start to change the norms of organisational behaviour. 
 
C   The Interplay between Soft Regulation and Norms 
Regulation has an important role in initiating discourse around social norms 
thereby developing and refining those norms. As Fasterling comments, ‘the 
potential of compliance disclosure regimes lies in their capacity to trigger a 
communicative process’.120 Nagarajan describes a network of actors involved in 
regulatory conversations around gender diversity that generate expectations 
among stakeholders and the community.121 Even if corporate governance codes 
are not effective in terms of disciplining certain behaviours they still have value 
in triggering dialogue and norm development. Thus norms and soft regulation 
work in parallel each reinforcing the other: the emerging international norm of 
including women on corporate boards is being encouraged by the ASX code 
recommendations and vice versa. By recommending disclosure of metrics, 
policies, targets and progress, the ASX code provides a soft law framework that 
each company can fill with its own norms that fit with its culture and operations. 
This article provides evidence of wider external norms developing in terms of the 
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content of diversity policies. Most companies will cover training, recruitment, 
promotion and flexible work in these policies. Since the introduction of the 
WGEA reporting regime, pay equity has also found its way onto the agenda. This 
evidence supports the theory that by building on emerging norms, soft regulation 
can encourage corporations to be ‘agents of social change’.122 
As introduced above, the effectiveness of soft regulation lies in 
understanding the institutional forces at play and making sure that they provide 
appropriate incentives and do not work against regulatory objectives. This is a 
difficult task. Indeed, Julia Black describes the relationship between regulatory 
rules and market behaviour as ‘a complex dance in which market behavior and 
regulatory action shadow, anticipate, and react to each others’ moves in turn’.123 
Several researchers have pointed out that the market forces that the designers of 
corporate governance codes predicted would provide enforcement pressure have 
not interacted with the regulation exactly as expected.124 Despite this, the comply-
or-explain mechanism does appear to have been effective at encouraging internal 
change. It is beyond the scope of this article to determine whether it is primarily 
the need to disclose that causes widespread adoption of corporate governance 
codes or the fact that most code-recommended practices are seen as valuable (or 
indeed a mix of both). The article has the narrower aim of demonstrating how 
codes can be internalised into management practice and that this is done through 
a gradual process of amending governance structures, policies, procedures and 
incentive schemes.  
 
D   Conclusion 
The evidence presented here demonstrates that the ASX code 
recommendations regarding organisational gender targets have resulted in 
policies and procedures that, if implemented properly, could have a significant 
positive effect on women in the workforce at all levels of the organisation. The 
findings suggest that successful soft regulation both builds on and develops 
social norms. Voluntary behaviour is driven by both internal value and external 
expectations, and soft law reflects rather than dictates emerging behavioural 
norms. The effects of soft law are gradual and subtle – incremental change rather 
than a sudden turn-around. The Norwegian gender quota for boards demonstrates 
that more dramatic change can be achieved using hard law with its deadlines and 
sanctions but that this kind of change may be more superficial, at least at the 
start. Nevertheless, European quotas for women on boards have undoubtedly 
influenced the response of companies to codes of corporate governance 
worldwide by providing a clear demonstration that hard law approaches can be 
used when softer options fail. 125  The existence of these quotas adds to the 
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institutional forces encouraging cooperation with Australia’s softer approach. 
Corporations will watch carefully any regulatory developments overseas and try 
to avoid strict regulation by voluntarily taking steps in that direction.126 Of course 
codes of corporate governance, and most legislative initiatives, do not cover all 
companies: they tend to be directed at the largest and most prominent corporate 
citizens in society. This is also true for norms of practice which can be size or 
industry specific as well as dependent on brand reputation. There is a need for 
research that reviews the issue of gender diversity, and code implementation 
more generally, in the context of company size and industry sectors. 
This article presents evidence suggesting that the Australian corporate 
governance code can influence management practices through recommending 
voluntary measurement, policy formulation and target setting. Regulation that 
combines these processes with a public disclosure regime, particularly one that 
asks for disclosure of progress towards self-set targets, can initiate change despite 
the lack of enforcement. Further research will be needed to monitor progress 
towards increased diversity but, in a supportive institutional environment, the 
code recommendations appear to have initiated a process of change that just 
might make the workplace more conducive to female career progression. As a 
regulatory case study, the story of gender diversity in Australia provides insights 
into the effectiveness of soft regulation more generally, demonstrating the 
importance of both micro and macro factors. Soft regulation must be drafted 
carefully to ensure a cyclical process of communication and change; it must also 
take into consideration the wider environment including cultural trends both 
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